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AUSTRALIA’S “NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS 
AFFAIRS”: A NEW APPROACH OR A NEW 
PATERNALISM? 
Joshua M. Piper† 
Abstract: The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (“ATSIC”) 
opened its doors in 1990 with the main objectives of advising the Australian 
Commonwealth Government (“Government”) on Indigenous policy and providing services 
for Indigenous communities and individuals.  Fifteen years later, with Indigenous living 
standards still well behind other Australians, the Government deemed ATSIC a failure and 
abruptly gutted and abolished the Commission.  At the same time, the government 
transitioned to its New Arrangements in Indigenous Affairs program (“New 
Arrangements”). 
The New Arrangements are based on two fundamental ideas: better coordination 
between governments and agencies; and, most important, engaging and empowering 
Indigenous communities to run their own affairs and find their own solutions.  To 
implement these ideas, the Government relies on negotiated agreements as the best way to 
reformulate Indigenous-State relations.  Under this model, Government Indigenous 
Coordination Centers will negotiate agreements directly with local Indigenous 
representative bodies to remedy issues identified by Indigenous peoples themselves.  As 
such, the New Arrangements framework successfully incorporates the principles of 
modern contractualism, which has potential to fulfill Indigenous peoples’ desires for 
sovereignty and justice.   
However, in transitioning to the New Arrangements, the Government acted hastily 
and unilaterally, potentially undermining the success of its new program.  With some 
adjustments and additions, the Government can strengthen the new policy and redress any 
harm caused by the quick and uncompromising transition. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the East Kimberly region of Western Australia, on the edge of the 
Tanami Desert, lives a remote Indigenous1 community of about 150 people 
known as the Mulan.2  In 2003, the Mulan found themselves with two 
serious problems to confront:  their fuel pump and storage tanks were 
corroded, requiring a ninety kilometer round trip to the next community to 
get fuel; and the community’s children had one of the world’s highest rates 
of trachoma—a bacterial infection of the eyes and the most common cause 
                                           
†
 University of Washington School of Law, J.D. expected 2006.The author would like to thank 
Jennifer Sorenson as well as the members of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their unparalleled 
patience and support, especially Alyssa Vegter, without whom this Comment would never have been 
published. 
1
  As a matter of brevity and uniformity, I use the terms “Indigenous” and “Indigenous Australians” 
throughout the Comment when referring to the Aboriginal peoples of Australia and the Torres Strait Islands. 
2
  See Stuart Rintoul, Long Walk Pushes Accord Talk, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 11, 2004, 
Features, at 20.   
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of preventable blindness in the world.3  For the fuel facilities, the Mulan 
leadership approached the Commonwealth Government (“Government”) for 
replacement funds but was denied.4  To combat the trachoma, the 
community instituted a twice-daily face-washing program at school; 
eighteen months later, trachoma infection rates among children had dropped 
from eighty percent to sixteen percent.5 
As the Mulan (and many other Indigenous communities) confronted 
pervasive and enduring poor living standards, the Government’s Indigenous 
Affairs program was in upheaval.6  The Government had introduced 
legislation to abolish the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Commission 
(“ATSIC”), a national Indigenous representative body responsible for 
delivery of a major portion of the Government’s Indigenous services.7  At 
the same time, the Government rapidly instituted what it called the New 
Arrangements in Indigenous Affairs (“New Arrangements”).8  This purely 
administrative reform was based on the principles of better government 
coordination and “shared responsibility” in achieving tangible 
improvements for Indigenous Australians.9  The New Arrangements relied 
heavily on negotiated agreements to ensure this shared responsibility.10 
These two narratives converged in December 2004 when the Mulan 
signed the first publicized Shared Responsibility Agreement (“SRA”) under 
the New Arrangements.11  Under the agreement, the Mulan received new 
fuel facilities—worth $172,260—from the Government in exchange for 
promises to continue and expand their hygiene program; children had to 
shower daily in addition to washing their faces twice a day, and everyone 
                                           
3
  Amanda Banks & Paige Taylor, Routine Routs Eye Disease, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 10, 2004, Local, at 
1; Rintoul, supra note 2.  Four out of five Mulan children aged 10 to 16 were infected with Chlamydia 
trachomatis bacterium.  See Banks & Taylor, supra. 
4
  See Steve Pennells, Rules Unfair, Say Proud Mulan People, THE AGE, Dec. 10, 2004. 
5
  Banks & Taylor, supra note 3. 
6
  See infra Part II.B. 
7
  See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Amendment Bill 2004, No. 04090 (Cth.). 
8
  Press Release, Senator Amanda Vanstone, Dep’t for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs, New Service Delivery Arrangements for Indigenous Affairs (Apr. 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.atsia.gov.au/media/media04/v04012.htm; OFFICE OF INDIGENOUS POLICY COORDINATION, 
DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN 
INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS (2004) [hereinafter NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS]. 
9
  NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 1-2. 
10
  Id. at 17-18. 
11
  Emma Macdonald, Washing Hands of Responsibility: Carr, CANBERRA TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at 
A5; DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, SHARED RESPONSIBILITY 
AGREEMENT FACT SHEET, MULAN, WESTERN AUSTRALIA, available at http://www.indigenous.gov.au/sra/ 
wa/fact_sheets/wa08.pdf. 
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had to reduce the amount of rubbish in the town.12  This first SRA was a 
fitting inagural agreement because it embodied both the potential for 
positive outcomes through the New Arrangements, as well as the 
Government’s seeming insensitivity and carelessness in implementing them.  
Initially, the Mulan have seen beneficial results in terms of physical health 
(trachoma rates are now at zero) and economics, as well as exercising some 
form of self-determination.  However, the cries from many Indigenous 
leaders of paternalism, assimilation, and social engineering inherent in the 
Mulan agreement highlight how haphazard and unplanned the transition has 
been.13 
The New Arrangements have empirical potential for redressing many 
Indigenous inequities because their basis in contract theory can engage the 
structures of self-determination within Indigenous communities.14  These 
agreements by themselves should be seen as a first step towards greater self-
determination, sovereignty, and justice.15  The contract model is no panacea, 
however, and in the Indigenous-State context must be carefully implemented 
with appropriate protections.16  If the Government, led by Prime Minister 
John Howard, truly wishes to “improve the outcomes and opportunities and 
hopes of indigenous people,”17 it needs to invest heavily in Indigenous 
leadership capacity, support a new national Indigenous representative 
structure, and make the New Arrangements more transparent and 
independent through legislation.18 
The next Part of this Comment details the evolution of 
Commonwealth Indigenous policy in Australia leading up to the New 
Arrangements, focusing mainly on the operation and eventual demise of 
ATSIC.  Part III examines the increasing scholarship on modern 
contractualism,19 which endorses the use of negotiated agreements between 
Indigenous people and settler, or post-colonial, governments as a way to 
remedy historical inequity and injustice.  Part IV explores the New 
                                           
12
  Macdonald, supra note 11. 
13
  See Patricia Karvelas & Stuart Rintoul, It’s Patronising, Declares Lowitja, WEEKEND 
AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 11, 2004, Local, at 4; Pennels, supra note 4; Pat Dodson & Noel Pearson, Op-Ed., The 
Dangers of Mutual Obligation, THE AGE, Dec. 15, 2004. 
14
  See infra Parts III.B-C, IV.B. 
15
  See infra Part IV.B. 
16
  See infra Part III.E. 
17
  Prime Minister John Howard, Joint Press Conference with Senator Amanda Vanstone (Apr. 15, 
2004), http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/Interview795.html. 
18
  See infra Part V.B-D. 
19
  I use the term “contractualism” interchangeably with “agreement making” throughout most of the 
Comment to refer to the process of negotiated agreements. 
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Arrangements in detail, concluding that they are a successful 
implementation of contractual principles and hold unique promise for 
Indigenous Australians seeking self-determination and meaningful justice.  
Part V argues that, because the Howard government acted hastily and 
unilaterally in completely abolishing ATSIC and implementing the New 
Arrangements, it needs to take immediate and earnest steps to repair any 
potential damage. 
II. THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT HAS ATTEMPTED TO REDRESS 
INDIGENOUS INEQUITIES IN THE PAST THROUGH SELF-DETERMINATION 
Since 1967,20 the Government has attempted to implement Indigenous 
policies reflecting self-determination and self-management, as well as 
provide a national representative voice for Indigenous Australians.21  These 
attempts were in response to the inequitable living standards of Indigenous 
peoples across Australia.22  Prior to ATSIC, the most notable attempts were 
the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee, created in 1973 and 
succeeded by the National Aboriginal Conference in 1977, the members of 
which were elected solely by Indigenous Australians.23  However, because 
these organizations remained primarily advisory bodies and were not always 
well-connected to their constituents, they proved less successful than 
expected.24  When it created ATSIC in 1989, the Hawke Government25 
sought a body with a much closer relationship to government and the power 
and responsibility to deliver programs and services.26  Unfortunately, due to 
structural conflicts created at its inception and frequent amendments, ATSIC 
failed to achieve broad, meaningful results for Indigenous Australians.27 
                                           
20
  A 1967 Constitutional referendum allowed Parliament to legislate specifically towards Indigenous 
issues without violating prohibitions against racial preference.  AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION, § 51(xxvi).  
21
  See Kingsley Palmer, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, Research 
Discussion Paper No. 12, ATSIC: Origins and Issues for the Future, A Critical Review of Public Domain 
Research and Other Materials 4-5 (2004). 
22
  See DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, INDIGENOUS FACT 
SHEET § 2.8, http://www.atsia.gov.au/facts/docs/OIPC_FactSheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2005) 
[hereinafter INDIGENOUS FACT SHEET]. 
23
  SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, AFTER ATSIC—
LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM? 17 (2005) [hereinafter LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?]. 
24
  See id. at 17-18. 
25
  The Hawke Government held office from March 1983 to December 1991. 
26
  HON. JOHN HANNAFORD ET AL., IN THE HANDS OF THE REGIONS—A NEW ATSIC: REPORT OF THE 
R E V IE W  O F  T H E  A B O R IG IN A L  A N D  T O R R E S  ST R A IT  IS L A N D E R  C O M M IS S IO N 16  (2003) . 
27
  See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 28-37. 
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A. Legislative Compromises Permanently Hindered the Commission 
The Hawke Government envisioned ATSIC as a major advance in the 
administration of Indigenous affairs.28  The proposed legislation sought a 
body combining representative and executive duties, administering the 
Government’s Indigenous programs through a system of Regional Councils 
and a national board (Commission) elected by Indigenous people.29  
ATSIC’s guiding purpose was to ensure that Indigenous Australians 
participated in decision-making processes on matters that affected them.30 
This proposed body was controversial, combining as it did executive 
and representative powers.31  Because ATSIC was seen by some as setting 
up an alternate government, beyond the control of the Parliament, it 
“suffered heavily at the hand of the Opposition party during the passage of 
the Bill.”32  In fact, at the time, the bill to create ATSIC received the second-
most number of amendments in Australian history.33   
Parliament finally passed the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission Act 1989 (Cth.) (“ATSIC Act”) on November 4, 1989, two 
years after it had been proposed.34  To maintain the desired perception of 
greater Commission autonomy, the bill’s supporters agreed to several 
measures—mainly increased accountability—that ensured ATSIC would 
remain answerable to the Parliament.35  Years later, this rigid system of 
accountability “was [often] cited as a serious (and unnecessary) impediment 
to ATSIC’s operations, one which inhibited progress in the achievement of 
better outcomes for Indigenous Australians.”36 
                                           
28
  See Angela Pratt & Scott Bennett, Parliamentary Library Information and Research Services, The 
End of ATSIC and the Future of Administration of Indigenous Affairs, Current Issues Brief No. 4 2004-05, 
at 6 (Aug. 2004). 
29
  See id. 
30
  See HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26, at 16.  According to section 3 of the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth.), the objectives of the Commission were:  1) to ensure maximum 
participation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in government policy formulation and 
implementation; 2) to promote Indigenous self-management and self-sufficiency; 3) to further Indigenous 
economic, social and cultural development; and 4) to ensure co-ordination of Commonwealth, state, territory 
and local government policy affecting Indigenous people. 
31
  See Pratt & Bennett, supra note 28; Palmer, supra note 21, at 6 (citing M. Dillon, Institutional 
Structures in Indigenous Affairs, in SHOOTING THE BANKER: ESSAYS ON ATSIC AND SELF-DETERMINATION 
94 (P. Sullivan ed., 1996)).   
32
  Palmer, supra note 21, at 6; see also Pratt & Bennett, supra note 28. 
33
  See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 20; Pratt & Bennett, supra note 28, at 7. 
34
  See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth.); LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, 
supra note 23, at 20. 
35
  See Pratt & Bennett, supra note 28. 
36
  Palmer, supra note 21, at 6. 
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The resultant Commission retained the basic dual structure envisioned 
by its proponents.  ATSIC’s representative component consisted of 35 
popularly elected Regional Councils and a National Board of 
Commissioners elected by the Regional Councils.37  The administrative arm 
was responsible for the delivery of ATSIC programs, the majority of which 
targeted economic development and improved social and physical health.38  
Nonetheless, over the next fifteen years, the concessions and amendments 
made to the ATSIC Act would hinder the Commission and its goals.39 
B. Despite Its Successes, ATSIC Experienced Controversy and Became a 
Political Scapegoat 
ATSIC had many successes during its 15 years of existence, despite 
much reporting to the contrary.40  ATSIC’s record of political participation, 
representation, and innovation on behalf of Indigenous Australians was 
unmatched by any mainstream agency.41  At the national level, ATSIC 
achieved increased participation of Indigenous leaders in several national 
policy bodies.42  Many programs administered by ATSIC focused clearly on 
the needs of Indigenous people and brought appreciable gains—the 
Community Development Employment Projects (“CDEP”) and the financial 
agency Indigenous Business Australia among the most notable.43  In 2002-
03, ATSIC funds built roughly 500 houses, renovated 760, and made 537 
home loans, housing more than 1600 people.44  These are only a few 
examples of ATSIC’s impact.45 
                                           
37
  See Pratt & Bennett, supra note 28, at 8. 
38
  See id. at 8-9.  Indigenous-specific programs in many areas, including social security, education, 
health, and welfare were to be delivered by or through the auspices of other federal, state, and territory 
governments.  See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 14. 
39
  As a result of persistent criticism, ATSIC underwent several major changes during its life, not least 
of which was the separation of the administrative arm into a separate agency.  See LIFE IN THE 
MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 20; HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26, at 18-20. 
40
  See Palmer, supra note 21, at 7-9. 
41
  See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 38. 
42
  See id.  Such policy bodies included, among others, the National Health and Medical Research 
Council and the Australian Seafood Council.  Id. 
43
  See id. at xvii.  CDEP is the largest Indigenous program funded by the Government.  It provides 
employment and training opportunities to Indigenous participants in a range of activities that benefit both 
individuals and their communities.  Id. at 13. 
44
  See id. at 39. 
45
  Dr. Will Sanders identifies at least five areas of achievement for ATSIC:  political participation of 
Indigenous peoples, a national Indigenous voice increasingly independent of Government, distinctive and 
culturally appropriate programs, using regional planning, and working with States and Territories.  Will 
Sanders, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, ATSIC's Achievements and Strengths: 
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ATSIC also had its share of controversies and failings over the years, 
though some were undeserved.46  One review of its history showed that 
ATSIC had “laboured under much criticism, and despite many positive 
statements by its senior representatives, ha[d] been forced into a defensive 
position and . . . had to use time and resources to do so.”47  By the time of its 
demise, only 20% of Indigenous Australians were participating in 
elections.48  Several Commission members, including the Chairperson, 
became embroiled in political corruption scandals.49  Moreover, a significant 
2003 Government report documented the still pervasive poor living 
standards of most Indigenous Australians, including a twenty year gap in life 
expectancy.50  There had been seemingly little progress in the 13 years since 
ATSIC’s creation.51   
Accordingly, the Government took up a comprehensive review of 
ATSIC.52  This report, released in 2003, documented widespread Indigenous 
support for the concept of ATSIC and recommended that its national 
representative structure be retained, although modified.53  The report’s main 
recommendation was to move much of the decision-making into the hands 
of the Regional Councils who were more connected to their constituencies.54 
                                                                                                                              
Implications for Institutional Reform (2004), at 1, http://www.anu.edu.au/caepr/Publications/topical/ 
SandersATSICAchievement.pdf.   
46
  A common perception of ATSIC was that it controlled all Government services and programs that 
affected Indigenous peoples and was wholly responsible for poor living standards.  See LIFE IN THE 
MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 13.  In health and education, for example, where Indigenous policy and 
service delivery have been provided by mainstream agencies for many years, Indigenous Australian’s 
circumstances continue to lag well behind those of other Australians.  See id. at xvi-xvii. 
47
  Palmer, supra note 21, at 10. 
48
  LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 130.  In fact, “in some regions of the country, the 
relationship between ATSIC and the people it is designed to serve is tenuous at best.”  HANNAFORD ET AL., 
supra note 26, at 28. 
49
  See, e.g., Tony Koch, Clark Facing Dismissal as ATSIC Chair, COURIER MAIL, July 16, 2003, 
News, at 1; Kirsten Lawson, ATSIC Deputy Quits, Vows To Clear His Name, CANBERRA TIMES, June 26, 
2003, at A2; Maria Moscaritolo, ATSIC Leaders Under Scrutiny, HERALD SUN, Mar. 22, 2003, News, at 22. 
50
  STEERING COMMITTEE FOR THE REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE PROVISION, OVERCOMING 
INDIGENOUS DISADVANTAGE, KEY INDICATORS REPORT 2003 passim (2003) [hereinafter KEY INDICATORS 
REPORT].  Indigenous Australians have a life expectancy 20 years less than other Australians; a higher rate 
of disability resulting from environmental and trauma-related factors; significantly lower average incomes 
and much higher unemployment rates; a significantly higher suicide rate; disproportionate victim rates from 
crime; and a disproportionate prison population.  Id. at xxiv-xxxiii. 
51
  See id. at v (“Notwithstanding many years of policy attention, this Report confirms that Indigenous 
Australians continue to experience marked and widespread disadvantage.”). 
52
 Press Release, Minister Philip Ruddock, ATSIC Review Panel Announced (Nov. 12, 2002), 
available at http://www.atsicreview.gov.au/media.html. 
53
  See HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26, at 8. 
54
  See id. 
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Despite the recommendation of the 2003 Review, ATSIC could not 
escape the rhetoric of blame and became the target of both sides of the 2004 
Commonwealth election.55  Both the Labor Party and Coalition Government 
singled out ATSIC as an impediment to change and a waste of tax-payer’s 
money.56  The Howard government won reelection in 2004 and quickly 
moved to abolish ATSIC by legislation.57  The Opposition referred the bill to 
a Senate Committee for an investigation into the changes.58  In February 
2005, the Senate Committee tabled its report,59 which, although extremely 
critical of the legislation and the Government’s other reforms, did little to 
stop the bill’s passage the following month.60  On March 24, 2005, ATSIC 
ceased to exist.61 
C. Politics Aside, ATSIC Would Never Have Achieved Its Full Potential 
Without Reforming Its Representative Structure 
ATSIC suffered from at least two conditions that plagued its attempt 
to address Indigenous inequity, both recognized by the 2003 Review.62  First, 
ATSIC contained a dual system of accountability, uniquely responsible to 
both its constituents and the Government.63  It was committed to the 
ideology of self-determination while also being an institution of the 
Government, responsible for the development and implementation of public 
policy.64  ATSIC could not sufficiently separate these dual responsibilities in 
both the administration of programs and the representation of interests.65  
This unusual arrangement inhibited progress and was “primarily responsible 
                                           
55
  See Andrew Fraser, We’ll Abolish ATSIC, Says Labor Party, CANBERRA TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at 
A3; Mark Phillips, PM to Make Aborigines Mainstream, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 1, 2004, Local, at 2. 
56
  See Few Would Mourn End of ATSIC, WEST AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 1, 2004, at 18.  Both the Coalition 
and Labor Party promised to abolish ATSIC if elected to run the government.   
57
  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Amendment Bill 2004, No. 04090 (Cth.). 
58
  See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 1. 
59
  Id. 
60
  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Amendment Act 2005 (Cth.); see Press Release, 
Senator Amanda Vanstone, Dep’t for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, ATSIC Bill 
(Mar. 16, 2005), available at http://www.atsia.gov.au/media/media05/v0505.htm. 
61
  See Press Release, Senator Amanda Vanstone, Dep’t for Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs, ATSIC Now History—A Better Future Ahead for Indigenous Australians (Mar. 24, 
2005), available at http://www.atsia.gov.au/media/media05/v0506.htm. 
62
 See HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26, at 5-7. 
63
  Palmer, supra note 21, at 6. 
64
  Id. at 12. 
65
  See id. at 5; LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 29; Pratt & Bennett, supra note 28, at 8.  
In an attempt to cure these perceived conflicts of interest and possible corruption within the Commission, the 
Government turned ATSIC’s administrative arm into a separate agency in 2003 known as Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Services (“ATSIS”).  See id. 
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for the numerous contradictions, conflicts, and dilemmas facing the 
Commission.”66 
Second, ATSIC’s power was concentrated in the National 
Commission, sidelining the local communities as stakeholders as opposed to 
directly involved parties.67  Representation at the community level had 
always been considered impractical, and a formal electoral system was 
imposed, substantially different from the grass roots approach some saw as 
more culturally appropriate.68  Moreover, ATSIC actually neglected 
community development in concentrating so heavily on program and service 
delivery.69 
In sum, ATSIC was a body unique in the world and the culmination of 
thirty years of national Indigenous representation.70  The Commonwealth 
government created ATSIC with much hype about its novelty and much 
hope for its ability to help resolve the mounting issues affecting Indigenous 
Australians.71  In spite of its novelty, ATSIC’s creators were wrong about its 
ability to achieve substantial, widespread improvements for Indigenous 
Australians.  Although some explanations involve external forces on the 
Commission, at least part of the problem involved the basic structure of 
ATSIC as the embodiment of the Indigenous-State relationship. 
III. NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS ARE THE WAY FORWARD FOR INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES AND SETTLER GOVERNMENTS 
Australia is not alone in confronting issues of Indigenous inequality.  
Around the world, Indigenous peoples and the settler states that displaced 
them are struggling with how to resolve the myriad problems that arise from 
the injustice and discrimination that typically accompany such 
displacement.72  Recently scholars and politicians have championed the use 
                                           
66
  Palmer, supra note 21, at 6, 10. 
67
  See HONOUR AMONG NATIONS: TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 251 
(Marcia Langton et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter HONOUR AMONG NATIONS]. 
68
  See Palmer, supra note 21, at 6 (citing H. C. Coombs, Towards a National Aboriginal Congress, at 
18-22 (extracts from a report to the Hon. Clyde Holding, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, April 1984) 
(1986)); HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26, at 29. 
69
  Palmer, supra note 21, at 12. 
70
  See HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26, at 16; Pratt & Bennett, supra note 28, at 6. 
71
  See GERRY HAND, MINISTER FOR ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS, POLICY STATEMENT, FOUNDATIONS FOR 
THE FUTURE 1-3 (1987). 
72
  See generally STUDY ON TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND OTHER CONSTRUCTIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
BETWEEN STATES AND INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, FINAL REPORT BY MIGUEL ALFONSO MARTÍNEZ, SPECIAL 
RAPPORTEUR, U.N. Commission for Human Rights, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20(1999) [hereinafter U.N. STUDY ON TREATIES] (examining the origins, contemporary 
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of negotiated agreements as the best way to achieve a peaceful, workable, 
and mutually beneficial solution to these problems.73 
A. Agreements with Indigenous Peoples Have Been Used Throughout 
History 
Agreements between Indigenous peoples and settler states can take 
many forms and use different names, but are by no means a new concept.74  
From the beginnings of European expansion into the New World through the 
era of colonialism, European settlers consistently relied on emerging 
concepts of international law to form treaties with Indigenous polities.75  
This system of treaty making “developed ad hoc to justify conquest, trade, 
safe passage and other exigencies of imperialism.”76  Eventually 
encapsulated by such colonial regimes, and subsequently, settler states, 
Indigenous peoples also resorted to negotiation for their rights of 
sovereignty, as well as the recognition and redress of injustices.77  However, 
as the need for alliances for security purposes receded and the settler groups 
began to recognize and rationalize their dominance, the use of treaties 
waned.78   
Interestingly, Australia never witnessed such historical treaty making.  
Various attempts by colonial and post-Federation agents to establish 
agreements with particular Indigenous leaders failed because the colonial 
governments deemed the Aboriginals incapable of recognition at law.79  For 
these governments’ ideological, political, demographic, and geographical 
ambitions, “it was more advantageous to regard Aboriginal people as 
unworthy of treaty like arrangements than to make commitments that might 
                                                                                                                              
significance, and potential value of concluding treaties, agreements, and other constructive arrangements 
between Indigenous peoples and States). 
73
  See generally HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67 (describing and analyzing a diversity of 
treaty and agreement-making instances between Indigenous peoples and others in settler states). 
74
  See Marcia Langton & Lisa Palmer, Treaties, Agreement Making and the Recognition of 
Indigenous Customary Polities, in HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 34, 40. 
75
  HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 4 (“The history of treaty making in the ‘New World’ 
extended over 400 years for the British and French, and over 500 years for the Spanish, Dutch and 
Portuguese, with divergent outcomes throughout the colonies. . . .  The reach of the European powers into 
the “New World” brought new peoples and civilisations within the ambit of a new international code of 
European regulation.”). 
76
  HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 4. 
77
  Id. at 1. 
78
  See U.N. STUDY ON TREATIES, supra note 72, at paras. 190-200. 
79
  Langton & Palmer, supra note 74, at 41. 
FEBRUARY 2006          AUSTRALIA’S NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS 275 
 
have become obstacles to the unfettered land appropriation in colonial 
Australia.”80 
B. Scholars Endorse a Modern Approach to Agreement Making as a 
Means of Addressing Indigenous Inequities 
In spite of the often unjust results of these historical agreements, 
academics, Indigenous leaders, business leaders, and politicians alike, 
champion a modern form of contractualism (or agreement making) meant to 
rearrange the Indigenous-State relationship for the benefit of all parties.81   
For the purposes of this Comment, contractualism refers to the 
language and practice of contract—the ordering of relations by negotiated 
agreement.82  In the traditional legal sense, a contract refers to an exchange 
of consideration and the establishment of a legally enforceable obligation—
an obligation which flows from the free choice of the parties.83  More 
specifically, a contractual relationship should involve:  1) parties with 
autonomy in their roles, 2) the identification of specific issues, 3) agreement 
or free consent to the terms, 4) transparency, and 5) consequences for action 
or inaction.84  Contractualism is also generally characterized by the 
principles of choice, voice, participation, and consent.85 
Modern contractualism is not much different.  Although historically 
confined to the realm of liberal political theory, commercial law, and 
economic exchange, today the language and practice of contractualism are 
“used to manage diverse problems in public administration, employment, 
schooling, ordering of private (marriage or marriage-type) relationships, 
women’s rights and minority rights.”86  In studying these newer realms, 
                                           
80
  Id. 
81
  See, U.N. STUDY ON TREATIES, supra note 72, at paras. 260-63; Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, 
Evaluating Agreements between Indigenous People and Resource Developers, in HONOUR AMONG 
NATIONS, supra note 67, at 303, 303-04; Bruce Harvey, Rio Tinto’s Agreement Making in Australia in a 
Context of Globalisation, in HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 237, 240; Stefan Matiation, 
Impact Benefit Agreements Between Mining Companies and Aboriginal Communities in Canada: A Model 
for Natural Resource Developments Affecting Indigenous Groups in Latin America?, 7 GREAT PLAINS NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 204, 205 (2002). 
82
  See Barbara Sullivan, Mapping Contract, in THE NEW CONTRACTUALISM? 1, 1 (Glyn Davis et al. 
eds., 1997). 
83
  See id., at 2; see also Patrick S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 L.Q. 
REV. 193, 194-5 (1978). 
84
  See Alex Matheson, The Impact of Contracts on Public Management in New Zealand, in THE NEW 
CONTRACTUALISM?, supra note 82, at 164, 168-69. 
85
  See John Buick, A Contractual Approach to Indigenous Self-Determination in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 113, 118 (2002). 
86
  See Sullivan, supra note 82, at 1. 
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scholars have attempted to redefine the basic elements of contractualism.87  
One political scientist describes four necessary conditions for modern 
contractualism: 1) obligation based on individualized consent, 2) explicit 
dialogue between the parties which informs that consent, 3) negotiation 
based on mutual adjustment on the terms of the contract, and 4) 
accountability for actions based on the first three conditions.88  These 
requirements do not materially differ from previous conceptions of the 
contract model, although they certainly involve important new concepts.89  
Therefore, modern contractualism refers less to a change in the process of 
making contracts, than to the diversity of issues to which that process is 
applied.90 
When applied to the realm of Indigenous-State relations, the process 
of negotiating agreements provides a model approach to achieving 
Indigenous self-determination within the realities of international law and 
politics in the 21st century.91  Those realities dictate that if Indigenous 
peoples are to peacefully and effectively realize self-determination, they will 
most likely have to exercise it within existing State structures and orders.92  
Scholars, and others, support negotiated agreements because they allow 
Indigenous peoples to contractualize the nature of their relationship with the 
State, thereby opening up opportunities to “(re)establish and (re)orient 
Indigenous-State relations” upon those principles of choice, voice, 
participation, and consent.93 
                                           
87
  See Gaby Ramia, The “New Contractualism,” Social Protection and the Yeatman Thesis, 38 
J. SOC. 49, 50 (2002) (Austl.). 
88
  See Sullivan, supra note 82, at 6 (citing Anna Yeatman, Interpreting Contemporary 
Contractualism, in JONATHAN BOSTON, THE STATE UNDER CONTRACT (Jonathan Boston ed., 1995)). 
89
  For example, modern contractualism tends to radically disaggregate and individualize governance 
into a series of contractual relationships, as opposed to the generic “social contract” historically associated 
with governance.  See id., at 6-7. 
90
  See Buick, supra note 85, at 117-18; Sullivan, supra note 82, at 6-7; Ramia, supra note 87, at 51. 
91
  Buick, supra note 85, at 114. 
92
  Id. at 113; see also S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2d. ed. 
2004) (“It is generally assumed that [international] norms [of self-determination and human rights], like 
indigenous self-determination more generally, will ordinarily be applied within the frameworks of existing 
states.”).  Anaya also notes that the tendency to equate self-determination with independent statehood has 
prevented widespread acceptance of the notion that self-determination, as an international legal principle, 
applies to Indigenous peoples.  See id. at 7-9. 
93
  Buick, supra note 85, at 118.  Indeed, experience has shown that agreements between Indigenous 
peoples and settler states have avoided much conflict.  As such, “agreement making has become a preferred, 
sometimes unavoidable part of the political and economic landscapes of settler states in which Indigenous 
and local peoples make their case for restitution of their inherent rights as peoples.”  HONOUR AMONG 
NATIONS, supra note 67, at 25. 
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C. Negotiated Agreements Promise Sovereignty and Justice for 
Indigenous Peoples 
At their core, Indigenous peoples’ claims against settler states revolve 
around self-determination.94  This can be broken down into two distinct 
demands:  the demand for sovereignty over their own affairs and the demand 
for justice.95  The concept of sovereignty is not uniform among Indigenous 
groups, but generally involves self-determination of membership, religious 
practice, child rearing, economics, and perhaps most importantly, land use.96  
As for justice, Indigenous groups generally seek some or all of the 
following: reconciliation (and perhaps reparations) for past injustices, the 
means to cure ongoing occurrences of injustice, and a commitment and plan 
to prevent future injustices.97 
According to many commentators, the mere process or act of 
negotiating agreements contributes greatly to the goals of sovereignty, 
regardless of the outcome.98  The negotiation and agreement process 
presupposes each party to be sovereign in their own right and equals in 
relation to each other, despite potential or real disparities in bargaining 
power.99  By engaging in the contractual process, each party is exercising its 
choice to make a contract and its power to give or withhold consent to the 
terms.100 
The process of contractualism also fulfils Indigenous goals for 
obtaining justice by employing and adhering to principles of choice, voice, 
participation, and consent during the negotiating process.101  The power of 
this process is that, “while it goes some way towards making amends for 
                                           
94
  See ANAYA, supra note 92, at 97. 
95
  Buick, supra note 85, at 119.  Buick notes that scholar Garth Nettheim identified ten classes of 
claims for self-determination advanced by Indigenous peoples since the 1970s.  Id. at 114, n.3.  However, 
for his argument supporting contractualism, Buick consolidates these claims into two types—sovereignty 
and justice—despite the danger of overgeneralization.  Id. (citing JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY 4-5 (1995)).  This Comment adopts Buick’s generalization of 
Indigenous self-determination into sovereignty and justice.  Accord ANAYA, supra note 92, at 103-110 
(distinguishing between the substantive and remedial aspects of Indigenous self-determination).  
96
  See ANAYA, supra note 92, at 129 (noting that Indigenous norms regarding self-determination 
generally include concerns over cultural integrity, social welfare and development, self-government, and 
land and resources). 
97
  See Buick, supra note 85, at 119. 
98
  See id. at 120; Lisa Strelein, Symbolism and Function: From Native Title to Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Self-Government, in HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 189, 190; Parry Agius et 
al., Comprehensive Native Title Negotiations in South Australia, in HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 
67, at 203, 203. 
99
  Buick, supra note 85, at 120. 
100
  Id. 
101
  Id. 
278 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 1 
 
past injustices, it also redefines future interactions between victims and 
perpetrators and attempts to negotiate improvements on existing social 
injustices.”102  Without good process, the parties will not have ownership of 
their agreement.  A paper agreement will exist, “but relationships on the 
ground—and the structures and processes of governance—will remain 
reflective of historical injustice.”103  Process is particularly important 
because its broader lessons can create justice elsewhere, whereas substantive 
issues are often tailored to the particular parties.104 
Nevertheless, the substantive outcomes of negotiated agreements also 
aid in fulfilling Indigenous demands for sovereignty and justice.  The actual 
terms of the agreement will identify and define the parties and the areas of 
their sovereignty, and spell out their sovereign rights and duties within the 
contractual relationship.105  At present, this will usually be a limited form of 
sovereignty for the Indigenous party, but this does not necessarily connote 
inferiority:  “As arrangements elsewhere in the world demonstrate, there is 
compatibility between a nation’s sovereignty and a state’s sovereignty.  This 
is the essence of federalism.”106 
Altogether, as long as the procedural contractual principles of choice, 
voice, participation, and consent are upheld, an agreement embodies 
substantive justice because it represents “what has been contracted for, 
participated in, negotiated upon, and consented to by the parties.”107  Such 
an agreement cannot reasonably or justly be rejected by any party to that 
agreement.108 
D. Native Title Negotiations Exemplify the Benefits of the Contractual 
Process with Regards to Sovereignty 
Australia has already to some extent witnessed the varied and mutual 
benefits of Indigenous-State contractualism through Native Title 
determinations.109  In 1992, the High Court finally recognized the existence 
                                           
102
  HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 1. 
103
  Agius et al., supra note 98, at 204. 
104
  Id. 
105
  Id. 
106
  HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 16; see also Sean Brennan et al., “Sovereignty” and 
Its Relevance to Treaty-Making Between Indigenous Peoples and Australian Governments, 26 SYDNEY L. 
REV. 307, 309 (2004) (concluding that the concept of sovereignty need  not be an impediment to treaty-
making in Australia).  
107
  Buick, supra note 85, at 120. 
108
  Id. at 121. 
109
  See Press Release, National Native Title Tribunal, National Trend Gathering Momentum with 
200th Agreement (Oct. 3, 2005), http://www.nntt.gov.au/media/1128302683_3736.html.  Other instances 
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of “Native Title” to land, giving Indigenous Australians significant legal 
power over their ancient land base for the first time.110  The next year, 
Parliament passed the Native Title Act, 1993111 (“NTA”), which created 
procedures for determining where Native Title exists and where it has been 
wholly or partially extinguished.112  One of the underlying principles of the 
NTA, which is more evident (at least in terms of legislative language) since 
its amendment in 1998,113 is the emphasis on agreement making as the 
preferred method of dealing with Native Title issues, and on mediation as a 
means of encouraging agreements.114  This emphasis “has provided a 
platform on which much negotiation, both Native Title and non-Native Title, 
has been built.”115  For the first time, large groups of Indigenous Australians 
are engaged in a process that recognizes their jurisdiction.116 
Native Title agreements have cultivated the exercise of previously 
suppressed Indigenous sovereignty such that the process itself is an exercise 
in self-determination.117  These negotiations and agreements also have the 
potential to protect social, cultural, and economic interests.118  This often 
revitalizes the rural and remote areas in which Indigenous peoples constitute 
                                                                                                                              
besides Native Title certainly exist.  For example, in October 2001, the Western Australia Government 
signed a Statement of Commitment with Indigenous peoples in that state, focusing on recognition of the 
continuing rights and responsibilities of Indigenous Australians, legislative protection of Indigenous rights, 
and regional and local approaches to address issues that impact Indigenous communities.  The Statement 
formalizes its reforms through agreements.  See Strelein, supra note 98, at 196. 
110
  Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 2 (Austl.).  Prior to Mabo, Australian common law 
held that the continent was terra nullius (no man’s land) at the time of Federation.  Id. at 32-34.  Negotiation 
and agreements making was not unknown prior to the famous Mabo decision; before 1992, statutory land 
rights schemes and, to a lesser extent, heritage legislation both provided a framework for some negotiation 
and agreement making.  HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 17. 
111
  Native Title Act, 1993 (Cth.). 
112
  One commentator argues that the NTA, as interpreted by the High Court of Australia, significantly 
constrained the breadth of Native Title as envisioned by the Mabo decision.  Noel Pearson, Land is 
Susceptible of Ownership, in HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 83, 83. 
113
  See Native Title Amendment Act, 1998 § 24c (Cth.) (creating Indigenous Land Use Agreements; 
consolidated into Native Title Act, 1993). 
114
  Graeme Neate, Agreement Making and the Native Title Act, in HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra 
note 67, at 176, 179.  As part of the 1998 amendments to the NTA, the Indigenous Land Use Agreement 
(“ILUA”) provisions sought to meet the needs of smaller ventures for agreements with Indigenous 
communities.  The ILUA provisions also recognized the desire on the part of commercial and Indigenous 
interests to be able to deal directly with each other in relation to particular projects, removing government 
entirely from some negotiations.  Strelein, supra note 98, at 193. 
115
  HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 16-17. 
116
  Id. 
117
  Agius et al., supra note 98, at 215.  Native title stimulated a culture of agreement making, “and it is 
this culture, within and outside the Native Title process, that begins to engage Aboriginal polities and 
Aboriginal jurisdiction.”  HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 20. 
118
  See HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 252. 
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significant majorities.119  Moreover, this modern agreement making allows 
the recognition of Indigenous Australian polities that statutes and common 
law have not.120  Indeed, one scholar urges that the success of the Native 
Title system be evaluated by both the legal conclusions of Native Title as 
well as its place in the recognition of Indigenous self-government.121 
However, Native Title negotiation can also go further than mere 
recognition of the traditional scope of Indigenous authority.  The process of 
negotiating Native Title has resulted in the extension of the jurisdiction of 
“surviving Aboriginal customary polities into postcolonial commercial and 
legal domains.”122  This provides mutual gain in that the State or industry 
gains access to resources in Indigenous territory, while the Indigenous 
people extend their property based “customary rights” into the modern 
economic and political sphere.123  Accordingly, there is broad and politically 
bipartisan support for agreement making, and Indigenous peoples, 
government, and industry are devoting substantial financial and other 
resources to the negotiation of agreements.124 
E. To Ensure the Success of Agreement Making, a Number of Challenges 
Must Be Overcome 
Agreement making is not without its shortfalls, especially in the 
context of Indigenous-State relations.  Poor leadership, unequal bargaining 
positions, cultural bias, and failure to plan for implementation and 
enforcement can sabotage the process and outcomes of negotiated 
agreements.  None of these drawbacks, however, is insurmountable or 
unavoidable. 
                                           
119
  Id. 
120
  Id. at 13. 
121
  Strelein, supra note 98, at 189-90.  For Strelein, Native Title is important in Australia’s legal and 
political structures because it is a measure of Australia’s ability to accommodate the rights of Indigenous 
peoples.  Id.  For Indigenous Australians, “it is not merely a form of title: it is a fundamental recognition of 
the distinct identity and special place of the first peoples.”  Id. 
122
  HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 13.  For a specific example of how the evolving 
recognition of Native Title has nurtured a distinctive approach to agreement making involving new sorts of 
relationships, co-operative exploration of a wide range of issues, and emphasis on process as a vehicle for 
exercising Aboriginal self-determination, see Agius et al., supra note 98, at 203. 
123
  Langton & Palmer, supra note 74, at 49. 
124
  O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 81, at 303-04. 
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1. Indigenous Parties Must Have Leadership and Capacity, and 
Bargaining Positions Must Be Maintained 
To ensure sound contractual relations and outcomes, Indigenous 
peoples must possess leadership skills and be conversant in the language and 
practice of contracts.125  Modern contractualism tends to disaggregate and 
individualize governance into a series of contractual relationships.126  Thus, 
to operate effectively within such a framework, individuals127 must be able 
“to make rational choices about their own interests, and be able to 
understand, negotiate, and adhere to contracts”—they must have capacity.128  
For Indigenous peoples engaged in negotiations with a settler state, capacity 
implicates the governance abilities and cultural authority of Indigenous 
governing institutions.129   
Indigenous governing institutions vary in capacity.  For some, 
capacity may not exist at all—many groups have not managed to maintain 
their traditional organization in the face of colonialism.130  In this situation, 
outsiders must encourage and support the creation of culturally appropriate 
and effective representative structures to ensure mutually beneficial 
agreements.  This may prove easier than imagined given that “[a] people do 
not desist from their political aspirations merely on the grounds of doctrinal 
denial of their existence or their capacity to engage politically with external 
entities.”131  However, appropriate funding and accountability measures 
should be a part of such encouragement and support. 
Beyond negotiating skills, the legal and political power behind 
Indigenous groups plays an important role.  Any negotiation proceeds based 
on the bargaining position of each party—a position often dictated by the 
legal rights of those parties and the political atmosphere of the time.  The ad 
hoc nature of individual agreements does little for the larger Indigenous 
community’s position; any agreements will only be binding on those parties 
and will not advance the legal position of Indigenous peoples in general.132  
In addition, the terms of many privately negotiated agreements are 
confidential, providing little guidance for similarly-situated Indigenous 
                                           
125
  Buick, supra note 85, at 118. 
126
  Id. 
127
  “Individuals” refers to individual persons as well as organizations. 
128
  Buick, supra note 85, at 118. 
129
  See id.; HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 252. 
130
  See U.N. STUDY ON TREATIES, supra note 72, at paras. 204, 206. 
131
  Langton & Palmer, supra note 74, at 43. 
132
  See Donna Craig, Native Title and Environmental Planning: Indigenous Land Use Agreements,  
17 ENVTL. & PLANNING L.J. 440, 450 (2000) (Austl.). 
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communities as to what they can or should expect from agreements.133  
Accordingly, maintaining the bargaining position of Indigenous parties and 
ensuring they are adequately resourced for the exercise are crucial factors to 
achieving outcomes that will have lasting benefit to Indigenous 
Australians.134 
Despite the shortcomings of the Native Title Act,135 both the 
Government and NGOs have experience in building capacity within 
Indigenous groups through the Native Title system.  The Government 
created the National Native Title Tribunal to, among other things, facilitate 
mediation relating to Native Title and assist people in negotiating 
Indigenous Land Use Agreements (“ILUAs”).136  The Act also provides for 
the recognition of Native Title representative bodies around the country.137  
In South Australia, an NGO helped create local representative structures 
(“Committees”) for Indigenous groups involved in a state-wide settlement of 
Native Title claims.  These Committees proved important to the Native Title 
groups in providing an appropriate and accountable avenue for claim 
management that was reflective of the group’s kinship and traditional 
decision-making processes.138  This type of support for nascent Indigenous 
governance and capacity is essential for the success of agreement-making. 
On the other hand, the Native Title system in Australia may suffer 
from severe unequal bargaining positions.  Noel Pearson, an Indigenous 
leader in Queensland, argues that despite the success of ILUAs, the 
negotiation process is still inherently one-sided.139  Under the current Native 
Title system, non-Indigenous parties are allowed to oppose claims for Native 
Title even though they have no rights or interests that are vulnerable.  All of 
their rights and interests are guaranteed by the common law and by 
validating legislation and the Attorney-General pays for their legal costs; 
thus, they have nothing to lose by refusing to consent to a finding of Native 
Title when the system assumes most claims can be settled by mediation and 
                                           
133
  See id. at 449. 
134
  Id. at 448. 
135
  One author notes that the NTA does not provide for any formal recognition of Aboriginal self-
government, and it does not anticipate the resources that are required for effective Aboriginal governance 
associated with Native Title.  See Agius et al., supra note 98, at 217.  That said, finding the resources 
needed for Native Title groups to build strong capacity for self-government is often a struggle.  Id. 
136
  Native Title Act, 1993, Part 6 (Cth.). 
137
  Id.; Neate, supra note 114, at 181. 
138
  Agius et al., supra note 98, at 208. 
139
  See Pearson, supra note 112, at 85 (“What is not understood about native title claims after Mabo, 
and certainly after the NTA, is that it is simply not possible for non-Indigenous parties to lose any legal rights 
or title as a consequence of a native title finding.  These land claims are not true litigations in the sense that 
either party may suffer loss as an outcome.”). 
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negotiation.140  Not only does such unequal positioning limit the potential 
outcomes for Indigenous peoples; it also provides less incentive for one 
party to negotiate in the first place. 
While this may be an extreme example, contractualism can still be 
beneficial even when the bargaining position of Indigenous peoples is 
particularly weak.  If parties are willing to set aside seemingly intractable 
disputes over matters like sovereignty, “then practical mechanisms and 
creative wording contained in skilfully negotiated treaties and agreements 
can allow the focus of negotiations to shift to defined and achievable goals 
of mutual concern while at the same time preserving each party’s legal 
position.”141 
2. Accommodating Competing Discourses Must Defeat Euro-centric 
Domination 
Some critics argue that contractualism involves a Euro-centric 
discourse and overly economistic model which inherently disfavors 
Indigenous peoples.142  Such criticism contends that contractual principles 
are altogether foreign to Indigenous peoples—a notion based in part on the 
historically unjust outcomes of treaties and agreements.143  Conflicting 
Indigenous-State discourses also support the idea that Indigenous peoples 
are at a cultural disadvantage.  Today States often seek to silence the past 
and tame the future of Indigenous-State relations, hoping to achieve a 
definitive result and move forward.144  By contrast, Indigenous discourse 
seeks to reestablish and reorient the relationship with the State while 
maintaining continuity with the past.145  Given this apparent disjuncture of 
discourse, the Euro-centric nature of contractualism might allow the State to 
force its own view on the other, making the agreement an instrument of 
domination, rather than of coexistence.146   
                                           
140
  Id. at 85-86. 
141
  HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 24. 
142
  See Sullivan, supra note 82, at 12; Paul McHugh, Crown-Tribe Relations: Contractualism and 
Coexistence, in THE NEW CONTRACTUALISM?, supra note 82, at 200.  One author wonders whether 
“agreements [are] essentially a rhetorical and ideological device designed by non-Indigenous interests to 
create the impression that Indigenous concerns are being addressed, while in reality they constitute a vehicle 
for continuing dispossession of Indigenous peoples.”  O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 81, at 304. 
143
  See Buick, supra note 85, at 127-28. 
144
  See McHugh, supra note 142, at 204. 
145
  See id. 
146
  Tim Rowse, Reflections on Contractualism and Coexistence in an Intercultural Context, in THE 
NEW CONTRACTUALISM?, supra note 82, at 217. 
284 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 1 
 
These concerns are misplaced.  Initially, building capacity among 
Indigenous leaders will help avert the claimed disfavor.  But moreover, there 
is little support for the assertion that Indigenous peoples in the past did not 
understand the nature of the relationships they were forming through 
treaties.147  The systems of commerce and trade that gave rise to contractual 
principles are not modern or even European/American creations and “have 
been ‘part of the human condition for at least as long as Homo sapiens has 
been a species.’”148   
Unfortunately, “[d]ispossession and disruption, international and 
domestic laws, and the never-ending expansion of the market and modern 
urban settlement into Indigenous domains, have all had an impact on the 
capacity of Indigenous peoples to sustain ancient livelihoods and 
lifeways.”149  This does not mean that Indigenous peoples are not willing to 
change.  In fact, today, Indigenous peoples often “want to benefit from the 
economic projects that consume their resource base, and moreover want to 
develop economically in their own right.”150  This is demonstrated by the 
wide range of agreements, covering an immense breadth and scope, between 
Indigenous groups and others in Australia.151  Although agreement-making 
has undoubtedly been a tool of European domination of Indigenous peoples 
in the past, “today it [can] become a means of facilitating that encounter on 
the principles of consent and choice, fairness and mutual respect.”152 
                                           
147
  Buick, supra note 85, at 127-28.  “[W]hat they misunderstood, if anything, were the frequently 
changing and contradictory intentions of the State parties, the trickery employed by these parties in the 
process and product of contractualism, and the underlying absence of good faith bargaining.  That was not 
something to be immediately gleaned from negotiations or the text of the agreement, but rather from the 
course of the subsequent history of relations.”  Id. at 128. 
148
 Buick, supra note 85, at 127 (quoting MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS 
AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 200 (1997)). 
149
 HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 25. 
150
 Id. 
151
 These include agreements relating to mineral resources, education and health service delivery, 
Native Title determinations, local government, arts and tourism, national parks and environmental 
management.  HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 252.  Similarly, though ILUAs were conceived 
as a means for providing contractual security for small commercial interests, this has not stopped Indigenous 
Australians from pushing the limits of the ILUA process:  “Native title claimants in South Australia, for 
example, have entered into direct negotiations with the South Australian Government and peak industry 
bodies under the ILUA process to negotiate a ‘state wide comprehensive settlement’ of native title issues, 
with a view toward progressive legislative, administrative, constitutional and procedural reforms.”  Strelein, 
supra note 98, at 194. 
152
  McHugh, supra note 142, at 214. 
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3. Implementation and Enforcement of Agreements Must Be Arranged at 
the Outset 
Often parties to an agreement concentrate exclusively on the goals 
they hope to achieve.  However, “the mere fact of an agreement does not of 
itself guarantee equitable outcomes for Indigenous parties.”153  The 
prospects for success are greatly influenced by the degree to which 
agreements contain the means for their own implementation and 
enforcement.154  Drafting clear, specific provisions is important155; but 
effective implementation and enforcement also echoes the call for 
organizational capacity of all parties to sustain their commitments.156 
Similarly, the enforceability of such agreements must be assured.  
Many historical agreements failed to protect Indigenous interests because 
they had no means of effective enforcement, and where an enforcement 
mechanism existed, Indigenous peoples often had negotiated agreements 
(re)interpreted in favor of powerful non-Indigenous interests.157  Modern 
agreements must be structured so that should implementation or 
performance under the agreement become a problem, the harmed party can 
avail itself of the benefits of the legal order within which the contractual 
relationship operates.158 
Some authors argue that the problems of implementation and 
enforcement implicate a party’s change of will, and not a failing of the 
process of contractualism itself.159  Nonetheless, a culture of agreement-
making can induce Indigenous reliance on the good faith of the State.  If the 
State has a change of will, an agreement might in fact leave an Indigenous 
party worse off than before.160  Accordingly, implementation and 
enforcement are essential to successful outcomes from negotiated 
agreements. 
                                           
153
  HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 252. 
154
  O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 81, at 325. 
155
  See id. at 306-08. 
156
  See id. at 325 (“The prospect that an agreement will actually be put into effect is influenced by a 
range of factors. . . . A critical issue involves the general human and organisational capacities of Indigenous 
and other parties, which shapes their ability to sustain commitments they have made under agreements.”). 
157
  See U.N. STUDY ON TREATIES, supra note 72, at paras. 125-27, 299-301. 
158
  See Buick, supra note 85, at 122. 
159
  Id. at 126. 
160
  See O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 81, at 304. 
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F. Although Alternatives to Agreement Making Should Be Utilized, Only 
Contractualism Provides a Comprehensive Solution to Indigenous 
Inequities 
Despite these potential shortfalls of Indigenous-State agreement 
making, an overview of the alternatives reinforces the wisdom of using such 
agreements in the modern world.  For example, physical resistance has 
obvious consequences, including death and destruction of property.  As 
perhaps a more acceptable alternative, Indigenous groups have the option of 
refusing to bargain for rights, and instead pursuing such rights in the settler 
state legal/political system.  Common law courts, however, have generally 
been unresponsive to the needs of Indigenous communities.161  “Although 
test cases are necessary to resolve outstanding legal questions (to create a 
clearer legal landscape in which to negotiate), . . . [a] litigated outcome is 
likely to be more costly (in financial, personal and temporal terms) than a 
mediated outcome, and the issues that are resolved are likely to be 
narrower.”162  Indigenous groups as well as judges have articulated this 
concern over the costs of litigation.163  Only contractualism provides a 
peaceful, coherent, and effective framework for Indigenous peoples to 
participate in, and consent to, the nature and terms of coexistence with 
States in their quest for self-determination.164 
In Australia, alternative methods of achieving self-determination are 
undoubtedly important arrows in the quiver.  Noel Pearson of the Northern 
Territory has argued that both radical and moderate strategies must be used 
in order to secure results.165  However, the existing tools, including Native 
Title negotiations, have limitations—some practical, others going much 
                                           
161
  The Mabo decision and subsequent Native Title cases in Australia are a good example.  For a 
discussion on the role of the courts and Native Title, see Carlos Scott López, Reformulating Native Title in 
Mabo’s Wake: Aboriginal Sovereignty and Reconciliation in Post-Centenary Australia, 11 TULSA J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 21 (2003).  See also Geoffrey Robert Schiveley, Note, Negotiation and Native Title: Why 
Common Law Courts Are Not Proper Fora for Determining Native Title Land Issues, 33 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 427 (2000). 
162
  Neate, supra note 114, at 183.  Indeed, experience has shown that these typical litigation costs are 
exaggerated in Native Title cases.  See id. 
163
  See O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 81, at 303-04 (“[Indigenous s]upport for agreement making 
results from a conviction that in comparison to the alternatives (essentially litigation or a resolution involving 
political conflict), negotiation of agreements is less time consuming, less costly, and more likely to permit 
‘win-win’ situations that allow benefits to be channeled to Indigenous people without creating a backlash 
from competing interests that have incurred a commensurate loss.”); Neate, supra note 114, at 182 (“There 
have been some very strong statements from superior courts about the importance of agreement making.”). 
164
  See Buick, supra note 85, at 119, 122; McHugh, supra note 142, at 214. 
165
  Strelein, supra note 98, at 199 (quoting Noel Pearson, Aboriginal Law and Colonial Law Since 
Mabo, in ABORIGINAL SELF DETERMINATION IN AUSTRALIA 157 (Christine Fletcher ed., 1994)). 
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deeper, to the heart of the colonial relationship.166  Inconsistent government 
responses exacerbate these limitations.167  As such, some scholars have 
recently called for coordinated Indigenous-State negotiations covering a 
wider range of issues, whereby Indigenous Australians can address issues 
not as a corporate interest, but as a collective, self-governing, and sovereign 
interest.168  The New Arrangements in Indigenous Affairs attempt to answer 
that call. 
IV. IN EMBRACING THE MODEL OF CONTRACTUALISM, THE NEW 
ARRANGEMENTS HOLD MUCH PROMISE FOR INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS 
The Government recently embarked on a new course in Indigenous 
affairs.  The New Arrangements are, in part, a response to the crisis of 
underdevelopment that is emerging because of increasing population growth 
and the failure of service delivery to meet the needs of Indigenous 
peoples.169  The Government hopes “to improve the outcomes and 
opportunities and hopes of Indigenous people in areas of health, education 
and employment.”170  Empirically and rhetorically, these New Arrangements 
are an innovative and promising approach to eradicating Indigenous inequity 
and injustice in Australia. 
A. The New Arrangements Seek Better Government Coordination and 
Empowerment of Indigenous Communities 
The New Arrangements consist of an entirely new administrative 
structure and appear to be based on two fundamental ideas: better 
coordination of the part of governments and agencies; and, most important, 
engaging and empowering Indigenous communities to run their own affairs 
and find their own solutions to problems through negotiated agreements.171 
                                           
166
  Id.  For example, agreement making has had wavering success with respect to the elimination of 
racial discrimination and protection of copyright; this is due largely to the cultural biases and entrenched 
racism that continue to permeate settler societies’ responses to the recognition and protection of Indigenous 
rights and interests.  HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 253. 
167
  Strelein, supra note 98, at 199. 
168
  Id. at 200.  In looking past Native Title, one author suggests that the effectiveness of these 
agreements could be enhanced by moving beyond a sole focus and developing better links to the whole-of-
government decision-making processes as this relates to a range of other key social and economic indicators.  
See HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 23. 
169
  HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 251; see also COMMONWEALTH GRANTS 
COMMISSION, REPORT ON INDIGENOUS FUNDING, at xiv-xvii (2001). 
170
 Prime Minister John Howard, supra note 17. 
171
 Fred Chaney, Common Ground Key to Moving Ahead, TALKING NATIVE TITLE, Dec. 2004, at 4; 
see also NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 1. 
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To facilitate the coordination of government services, the New 
Arrangements implement several structural changes.  First, Indigenous 
specific programs formerly administered by ATSIC are now administered by 
Government mainstream agencies under a “whole-of-government” 
approach.172  For example, ATSIC’s largest program, CDEP, is now run by 
the Commonwealth Department of Employment and Workplace Relations.173  
The ATSIC employees who ran the CDEP program were moved to the 
mainstream agency office.  Second, at the national level a Ministerial 
Taskforce on Indigenous Affairs (“Taskforce”) now provides “leadership and 
strategic direction” for Commonwealth Indigenous policy.174  The Taskforce 
is advised by a Secretaries’ Group and a National Indigenous Council 
(“NIC”), an appointed body of Indigenous Australians chosen for their 
expertise and experience in a range of policy areas.175  Third, at the regional 
level the Government established thirty Indigenous Coordination Centres 
(“ICCs”) throughout the country, usually in the locations of former ATSIC 
Regional Councils, which are managed nationally by an Office of 
Indigenous Policy Coordination (“OIPC”).176  The ICCs are the backbone of 
the New Arrangements, intended to be the community and regional level 
coordinator of all Government activity and the single point of Government 
contact for Indigenous peoples and communities.177  ICCs manage the 
delivery of most of the Government’s Indigenous programs and work with 
local Indigenous communities to develop innovative, flexible responses to 
local needs through negotiated agreements.178 
The more promising transformation that the New Arrangements bring 
to Indigenous Affairs is the focus on local Indigenous representation and 
empowerment and regional planning.  This is accomplished partly through 
                                           
172
 NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 1, 9.  “Whole-of-government” 
means “all government policies and funds must be coordinated and used efficiently and strategically in 
cooperation with local communities.”  Id. at 2. 
173
 Id. at 22. 
174
 Id. at 1, 11-12. 
175
 Id. at 12-13, 27-30.  The NIC is required it to provide expert advice to the Government on 
improving the socio-economic status of Indigenous Australians, including improvements in Government 
program performance and service delivery.  Id. at 12.  The Council advises on the appropriateness and 
effectiveness of programs within the Indigenous community and promotes constructive relations between 
government and Indigenous people, communities, and organizations.  Id.  It is also responsible for alerting 
the Government to current and emerging policy issues.  Id. 
176
  Id. at 15-16. 
177
  Id. at 5; ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER SOCIAL JUSTICE COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL 
JUSTICE REPORT 2004, at 81 (2004) [hereinafter SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2004], available at 
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social_justice/sjreport04/index.html. 
178
  NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 15; INDIGENOUS FACT SHEET, 
supra note 22, § 3.6. 
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Shared Responsibility Agreements (“SRAs”).179  Negotiated between 
Indigenous communities and the Government, SRAs address the needs and 
desires identified by Indigenous groups themselves.180  SRAs detail what all 
parties will contribute to achieve desired outcomes; in exchange for 
Commonwealth services and investment, Indigenous groups must offer 
commitments and undertake changes that benefit their community.181  The 
New Arrangements also call for “real partnerships” between governments, 
communities, NGOs, and the private sector as part of this shared 
responsibility.182  To facilitate SRA negotiations, the Government has 
pledged to identify new representative structures among Indigenous 
communities and negotiate with those entities as they arise.183    
In addition to localized SRAs, Regional Partnership Agreements 
(“RPAs”) between Indigenous representatives and Government are another 
focus of the New Arrangements.  RPAs allow for a coherent Government 
intervention strategy across a region, elimination of overlaps and gaps, and 
promotion of coordination to meet regional priorities.184  RPAs may also 
incorporate State and Territory commitments, as they play a vital role in 
servicing Indigenous Australians.185  The RPAs and ICCs bring a major shift 
in focus to the regional level, recognizing that different communities have 
widely different needs and resources. 
B. The New Arrangements Are an Effective Implementation of the 
Principles of Contractualism and Will Create More Meaningful 
Outcomes for Indigenous Peoples Compared to ATSIC 
The New Arrangement’s emphasis on negotiated agreements by itself 
demonstrates an endorsement of contractual principles.  However, five 
principles also underpin the New Arrangements—collaboration, flexibility, 
regional need, accountability, and leadership186—and each echoes the 
contractualist principles discussed earlier.187  Contractualism allows parties 
to have:  1) a collaborative, as opposed to adversarial, relationship; 
2) flexibility in designing solutions; 3) the ability to tailor the terms to 
                                           
179
  NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 18. 
180
  INDIGENOUS FACT SHEET, supra note 22, § 3.8. 
181
  NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 18. 
182
  Id. at 2. 
183
  See id. at 17; INDIGENOUS FACT SHEET, supra note 22, § 3.2. 
184
  NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 17. 
185
 Id. 
186
 Id. at 5-7. 
187
 See supra Part III.B. 
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specific needs; 4) defined and specific areas of accountability; and 5) an 
opportunity to exercise self-determination and leadership. 
These principles, and the New Arrangements in general, should be 
seen as an attempt to embody the notion that negotiated agreements achieve 
the best results for Indigenous peoples.  They flow from a belief that those 
people whose rights are at stake should be the decision makers in 
negotiations, with capacity to hold representatives and advisors 
accountable.188  In other words, the Indigenous groups should be the ones 
making decisions about outcomes, rather than having to accept outcomes 
negotiated by others.189 
The New Arrangements have real potential for fulfilling the goals set 
for, but not achieved by, ATSIC.190  First, in terms of political involvement 
and self-government, Indigenous Australian communities will be creating 
their own Indigenous representative models under the New Arrangements.  
These may be at the community, clan, or family level, or may even 
approximate the former ATSIC Regional Councils; but whatever model is 
chosen, it will be chosen by the community and not imposed by the 
Commonwealth government.  Second, such representation, coupled with the 
proven benefits of negotiated agreements, should further Indigenous 
economic, social, and cultural development.  Finally, ATSIC’s last 
objective—government service coordination—is infused through every 
aspect of the New Arrangements. 
Beyond the stated ATSIC goals, the local focus of the New 
Arrangements acknowledges the diversity of Indigenous Australians, and 
thereby accommodates the needs, demands, and potential of each 
community more than ATSIC ever did.191  Additionally, because the SRAs 
involve Indigenous peoples “as consensual parties, rather than as 
‘stakeholders,’” the terms and conditions of the agreements will help build a 
future relationship that is inherently more just than the imposed 
administrative solutions to which Indigenous Australians have been 
subjected since colonization.192 
While ATSIC was itself a unique and giant leap forward for 
Indigenous self-determination, in the end its structure was not as responsive 
to Indigenous communities as it needed to be.  ATSIC had no recognized 
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 Agius et al., supra note 98, at 216. 
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 See supra note 29. 
191
  See Strelein, supra note 98, at 200. 
192
  HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 251. 
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local representative structures and even the Regional Councils lacked the 
power to make program decisions for their regions.  By using agreement 
making at the local level, the New Arrangements present an opportunity for 
Indigenous Australian communities to cautiously take steps towards full 
self-determination.193 
The New Arrangements, however, are not without their problems and 
inconsistencies.  As of June 2005, more than 70 SRAs have been recorded 
by ICCs.194  As shown in the Introduction above, however, some agreements 
have been controversial.  Many observers have understandably attacked 
such agreements as paternalistic and assimilationist.195  The concept of 
“shared responsibility,” while meant to include Indigenous Peoples in 
making sure their communities succeed, unfortunately carries the 
connotation that they are somehow responsible for their own 
disenfranchised condition.  In addition, all the assurances and good 
intentions of the New Arrangements are mere rhetoric at this point.  The real 
test will be whether the Government follows through with funding and 
implementation of its promises. 
V. THE GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO TAKE STEPS TO BUTTRESS THE NEW 
ARRANGEMENTS 
The Government transitioned to the New Arrangements hastily and 
unilaterally, creating tension among the Indigenous community and 
undermining the potential for success of its new program.  Moreover, the 
uncompromising move appears directly contrary to the process the 
Government has embraced with contractualism—while the New 
Arrangements aim to engage and empower Indigenous peoples and their 
rights, the transition from ATSIC to the New Arrangements demonstrated a 
considerable lack of consensus or even openness by the Government.  By 
vigorously supporting the development of local and national Indigenous 
governance institutions, as well as initiating legislation to reinforce its 
                                           
193
  These negotiated agreements are not the comprehensive “treaties” sought by some Indigenous 
groups and advocated by experts.  However, they may be an important springboard for a Government 
previously closed to any form of treaty.  Once the Government gains some experience with the negotiations 
and outcomes of these agreements, it may be less fearful of relinquishing power to Indigenous communities. 
194
  INDIGENOUS FACT SHEET, supra note 22, § 3.8. 
195
  See The “New Arrangements” in Indigenous Affairs, ANTAR N.S.W. NEWSL., (Australians for 
Native Title and Reconciliation, N.S.W., Austl.), Apr. 2005, at 6 [hereinafter ANTAR N.S.W. NEWSL.], 
available at http://www.antar.org.au/nsw_news-ltr_04-05.pdf (“SRAs have been variously described by 
respected Indigenous leaders, Patrick Dodson and Noel Pearson as ‘not sufficiently well-developed and 
funded’, and by Professor Larissa Behrendt as ‘reactive and aimed at interventions rather than proactive and 
aimed at prevention.’”). 
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commitments, the Government can strengthen the new policy and redress 
any harm caused by the quick and uncompromising transition. 
A. The Government Acted Unilaterally in Abolishing ATSIC and 
Rearranging the Indigenous Affairs Program 
As Reconciliation Australia196 put it, “[p]olitics has determined the 
timing of the current re-shaping of Indigenous affairs at the national 
level.”197  With the ATSIC Board embroiled in controversy, the Government 
took the opportunity to announce its plans to abolish ATSIC.  Two and one-
half months later the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs revealed most of the details of the New Arrangements, 
which began formally the next day, July 1, 2004.198  The Government 
quickly moved to abolish the ATSIC Board, “leaving the 35 Regional 
Councils in place until 30 June 2005, with skeleton staff and miniscule 
operating budgets, to assist the transition on the ground.”199 
In abolishing ATSIC and the Regional Councils so abruptly, the 
Government created friction throughout the Indigenous community and its 
supporters.  Even though ATSIC was not an Indigenous creation, it operated 
as and was considered by many to be the voice of Indigenous Australia.200  
Many Indigenous organizations expressed grave concerns regarding the 
complete lack of consultation with Indigenous people about the changes.201  
Their sentiments were exacerbated by the fact that, “with limited 
                                           
196
  Reconciliation Australia is a non-government foundation established in January 2001 to provide a 
continuing national focus for reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australia.  See 
Reconciliation Australia, About Us, http://www.reconciliationaustralia.org/aboutus/recaus.html (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2005).  It is the continuing incarnation of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation aimed at a formal 
reconciliation process established in 1991, by a unanimous Commonwealth Parliament.  Id. (follow “what is 
reconciliation?” hyperlink). 
197
  RECONCILIATION AUSTRALIA, 2004 RECONCILIATION REPORT 7 (2004) [hereinafter 
RECONCILIATION REPORT]. 
198
  See Press Release, Senator Amanda Vanstone, Dep’t for Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs, Australian Government Changes to Indigenous Affairs Services Commence Tomorrow 
(June 30, 2004), available at http://www.atsia.gov.au/media/media04/v04039.htm. 
199
  ANTAR N.S.W. NEWSL., supra note 195. 
200
  RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 197, at 5.  The Senate Indigenous Affairs Committee found 
“considerable support” for the continued existence of ATSIC, if modified:  “Certainly, the support for the 
continued existence of a national Indigenous representative body was overwhelming.”  LIFE IN THE 
MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 60. 
201
  See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 5.  The Senate Report restates the testimony of 
Professor Mick Dodson: “It was like we did not exist. . . .  [P]olitical figures . . . talking about our future 
without and reference to us . . . seemed to deal with us as totally irrelevant and to ignore us.”  Id.  The 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies made the logical statement that 
“Indigenous peoples’ own representative structures [should] be withdrawn only with the consent of 
Indigenous peoples.”  Id. at 63. 
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explanation and no discussion,” the reforms went well beyond the 
recommendations of the $ 1.4 million 2003 ATSIC Review.202  That Review, 
based on extensive collaboration with Indigenous communities, had 
presented the Government with a model to reform, rather than abolish, 
ATSIC.203  Furthermore, some worried that the mainstreaming of 
Government programs would squander ATSIC’s extensive bureaucratic and 
cultural experience in Indigenous program and service delivery.204 
In addition, the actions of the Government preempted any 
Parliamentary decision on the future of ATSIC.  As noted above, ATSIC was 
created through a lengthy and thorough debate in the Parliament, and many 
felt it was for Parliament to decide what, if any, changes were to be made.205  
The Government defended that the immediate changes were administrative 
in nature and did not require legislative amendment by Parliament.206  
However, minority members of the Senate felt that while legally accurate, 
this was disingenuous, since “the Government’s changes dismantled ATSIC 
in all but name.”207 
After the transition, the accusations against the Government 
continued.  Many Indigenous Australians complained that apart from not 
being consulted, the changes were effected without adequate information 
being provided to them.208  Additionally, although the Government had 
promised to consult with the Regional Councils in creating new regional 
representative structures, evidence showed that the Councils were not being 
involved and that very little progress had been made.209  After calling the 
post-transition period “chaos,” one NGO noted that many mainstream 
departments “were unprepared for the transfer of staff, resources and 
programs” and that many community organizations had their funding 
delayed or interrupted.210 
                                           
202
  See id. at 6; HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26. 
203
  See HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26, at 8; LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 6. 
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  See ANTAR N.S.W. NEWSL., supra note 195, at 7.   
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  See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 8. 
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  Id. 
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  Id. 
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  See id. at 5; Angela Erini, Fed: Aborigines Left in the Wilderness Over Changes, AAP NEWSFEED, 
Apr. 8, 2005. 
209
  See SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2004, supra note 177, at 97. 
210
  See ANTAR N.S.W. NEWSL., supra note 195.  One Senator even commented in a floor debate that 
“utter chaos does reign as a result of hasty distribution of many of ATSIC’s functions to government 
departments.  Even the new policy dealing with mutual obligation through shared responsibility is unclear.  
No minister of public servant has been able to say what SRAs actually are, produce guidelines on how 
departments and communities should go about making them, or even confirm that they are legal, enforceable 
contracts.”  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Mar. 8, 2005, at 71 (Sen. Ridgeway). 
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Most of all, the quick transition created a sense that the Government 
had not fully considered its changes.211  As Senator Claire Moore related, 
“[The real concern is that,] once again, we may be experimented on and that 
in another five to ten years we will come back and discuss exactly what 
went wrong.”212  Thus, although the New Arrangements provide an 
opportunity for better outcomes for Indigenous Australians, significant 
hurdles remain for the Government to ensure that this is not another 
“experiment.” 
B. Substantial Investment in Leadership Capacity in Indigenous 
Communities Is Necessary to the Success of the New Arrangements 
As mentioned above, the substantive outcome of negotiated 
agreements is often affected by the sophistication of the parties at the 
negotiating table.213  Some fear that, like previous attempts to remedy 
Indigenous inequities, “current attempts will fail also if competent, 
legitimate Indigenous structures are not equipped to fulfill their end of the 
deal.”214  Encouragingly, many Indigenous communities have experience 
with self-governance and agreement-making, both historically in the inter-
Indigenous context and later extended to dealings with white settlers.215  
This experience is extremely relevant to modern agreement-making as a 
source of Indigenous legal customs and traditions.216  Some Indigenous 
groups have even demonstrated their ability to organize into simultaneous 
local and regional representation in modern Australia.217  This has been 
                                           
211
  See SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2004, supra note 177, at 85 (“It is clear that the various components 
of the new arrangements were not finalised at that time and have continued to be developed as the 
arrangements have been introduced.”).  In fact, the New Arrangements were modeled after ten ongoing pilot 
programs, the results of which have yet to be evaluated.  See NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, 
supra note 8, at 19-20; RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 197, at 7 (“[T]here is great danger in applying 
as a model for universal change approaches such as the COAG trials, which are still highly experimental and 
have not yet yielded quantifiable outcomes.”). 
212
  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Mar. 8, 2005, at 69 (Sen. Moore) (quoting 
ATSIC Commissioner Alison Anderson). 
213
  See supra Part III.E.1. 
214
  Chaney, supra note 171, at 4. 
215
  See Langton & Palmer, supra note 74, at 46. 
216
  In the Northern Territory, for example, principles of Larraika law, which require visitors to show 
respect for cultural authority of the traditional owners, underpins a regional agreement which seeks to 
address issues facing Indigenous “itinerants” visiting Darwin from remote communities.  The anti-social 
behavior of many “itinerants” in Northern Territory shopping districts had been a perpetual grievance for the 
business community.  Moreover, the “itinerants” themselves are denigrated and demonized.  The settler state 
has turned to, and effectively recognized, the legal and cultural authority of the traditional owners over the 
Darwin region.  See id. at 46. 
217
  See Agius et al., supra note 98, at 210; infra text accompanying notes 233-34. 
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apparent in the context of Native Title agreements.218  Even so, the 
comprehensive arrangements envisioned by the New Arrangements will 
require especially sophisticated negotiations. 
Accordingly, the Government needs to encourage and support 
Indigenous Australians in developing and maintaining strong governance 
structures at the regional and local levels.  If not, many will only be in a 
position to engage with government on an ad hoc basis that will achieve 
little.219  While this period of change will require time—many supporters of 
the New Arrangements have appealed for patience220—sufficient resources 
are the key to building and strengthening Indigenous leadership and to 
achieving objectives which are common to Indigenous people, government, 
and the broader Australian community.221  As such, the Government needs to 
allocate funds to expand opportunities for Indigenous leadership, 
governance, and administration training and development.  It has begun this 
funding with its 2005-2006 Budget submission, allocating “$85.9 million 
over four years ($23.1m in 2005-06) to develop [SRAs] with Indigenous 
communities.”222  As witnessed by many generations of Indigenous 
Australians, however, funding does not automatically ensure beneficial 
outcomes.223  Moreover, an apparent conflict of interest arises when one side 
of the negotiating table is charged with the duty of empowering the other 
side of the table.  Thus, aside from funding, the actual development of 
capable Indigenous representation needs to be regularly evaluated by an 
independent body. 
C. The Government Needs to Support a Representative Indigenous Body 
at the National Level 
The absence of a replacement national body for ATSIC has a 
substantial impact on Indigenous peoples across Australia.  ATSIC had the 
authority to consult with many agencies whose actions would affect 
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  See supra Part III.E.1. 
219
  RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 197, at 8. 
220
  See, e.g., Chaney, supra note 171, at 4 (“Leaders must allow sufficient time for effective 
governance structures to be developed regionally and nationally which will be central to the success of this 
most worthwhile initiative.”); see also RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 197, at 6. 
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  RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 197, at 5-7. 
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  Press Release, Senator Amanda Vanstone, Dep’t for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs, Government’s Indigenous Reforms Paying Dividends for First Australians—More Than $3 billion 
in 2005-06 (May 10, 2005), available at http://www.atsia.gov.au/media/media05/v0510.htm.  See generally 
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT INDIGENOUS BUDGET 2005, available at http://www.atsia.gov.au/budget/ 
budget05/index.asp. 
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  See KEY INDICATORS REPORT 2003, supra note 50, at i. 
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Indigenous peoples.224  Such a national voice “is important both to help 
shape policy and give it legitimacy and for enabling Indigenous Australians 
to call governments to account when their interests are not addressed.”225  
The “individualized, short-term, reactive agreements” of the New 
Arrangements cannot address the more complex and systemic causes of 
disadvantage and discrimination.226  Moreover, ATSIC represented a major 
force in advocating for Indigenous Australian rights in the international 
arena.227  The U.N. recognized ATSIC as a non-governmental organization 
legitimately capable of representing citizens in international fora.228  Without 
a national body to represent the interests of Indigenous Australians, these 
opportunities and safeguards are lost.229 
A National Congress of Indigenous representative structures should 
be put in place because local representative institutions cannot effectively 
attack the systemic and institutionalized aspects of the impediments to 
Indigenous socioeconomic and political development.230  For example, 
“Australia now stands alone among settler common law countries in its 
failure to introduce a Bill of Rights that would entrench the prohibition of 
race discrimination under Australian law.”231  Instead, Australia’s 
commitment to the prohibition is legislative,232 which “may be repealed, 
amended, or possibly ‘suspended’ by a government that lacks a commitment 
to human rights.”233  A national Indigenous body can more successfully 
advocate for a constitutional rights framework than can one particular 
Indigenous group. 
To be fair, the Government does not oppose the idea of a national 
Indigenous body.  The Government is open to a new national representative 
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structure, but believes that it should be left to Indigenous communities to 
form their own representative bodies.234  While this position has merit and is 
in line with self-determination principles, there are significant hurdles that 
face Indigenous communities in doing so.235  One may note that the NIC 
serves a purpose somewhat similar to that of ATSIC.  However, the NIC is 
not a representative body and cannot speak for the Indigenous community at 
large.236  Many Indigenous people are troubled by an advisory committee 
hand-selected by the Government itself.237   
Encouragingly, some Indigenous groups have already demonstrated 
their ability to at least organize into simultaneous local and regional 
representation in modern Australia.  During Native Title negotiations in 
South Australia involving several Indigenous groups throughout the state, 
the groups debated diverse issues, attempting to construct a “united voice” 
with which to speak to government and industry groups.238  In the end, they 
put in place a structure, in the form of a Congress, which embodied that 
“united voice” while providing for each individual Native Title group to 
retain autonomy in its own decision making.239  With encouragement and 
financial support from the Government, a similar process could lead to a 
national Congress of Indigenous Australians. 
D. The Government Should Pass Legislation to Guarantee Its Promises 
and Ensure Accountability 
One feature of the New Arrangements stands out from all previous 
attempts to organize a Government response to Indigenous issues:  it is 
strictly an arrangement of administrative units, procedures, and promises by 
the Government—not legislative reform.  Reforming through administrative 
procedures fulfills the Government’s goal of flexibility in implementing the 
New Arrangements.  However, it also makes the New Arrangements less 
transparent, more difficult to scrutinize, and potentially makes it more 
difficult to hold the Government accountable for its performance.240  
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Insufficient monitoring and evaluation processes exacerbate these 
problems.241  Experience has shown that where agreements are often 
confidential and without criteria for evaluating and addressing eventual 
outcomes, those outcomes have been mixed.242 
The Government needs to pass legislation that provides transparency 
and accountability for the New Arrangements and forces agencies to create 
systematic evaluation criteria.  “Just as it is dangerous to make assumptions 
about lack of capacity within Indigenous communities, it is potentially even 
more dangerous to assume capacity within government agencies to deliver 
this level of change,” especially given past Indigenous experience with 
mainstream agencies.243  In creating evaluation criteria, it is important to 
incorporate Indigenous measures of success—after all, it is Indigenous lives 
that these proposed changes are intended to improve.244  The “now 
fashionable ‘ideology of agreement making’ in Australia” needs to be 
tempered through examination of the equity and sustainability of actual 
outcomes of agreements.245 
Beyond measured outcomes, the standards by which performance will 
be measured should be addressed through legislative action.  These will 
necessarily be generalized standards, but should clarify the recourse should 
either party fail to meet its obligation.  Indigenous parties need to know who 
will determine whether a failure has occurred, whether the entire community 
will be held responsible for a community SRA failure—which will penalize 
those who fulfilled their obligation—or just particular individuals, and what 
penalty, if any, will apply.  More importantly, legislation should clarify how 
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an Indigenous community enforces an agreement if the government and its 
agencies fail to meet their obligations. 
Additionally, because SRAs only apply to “discretionary” benefits, the 
classification of a benefit as an entitlement or discretionary presents a 
potential source of conflict.  The line between the two can be fine, and such 
distinctions remain subject to non-transparent individual government 
officer/agency judgments.246  Finally, the New Arrangements create an 
obvious conflict of interest in Native Title determinations—the Government 
is now directly involved in funding both opposing parties in a native title 
claim.247  Accordingly, the Government should, via transparent legislation, 
ensure the enforceability of SRAs and RPAs, establish a process for dispute 
resolution, publish categories of benefits, and remove any conflicts of 
interest.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
All Australians stand at the brink of momentous promise in the 
struggle to eliminate Indigenous inequity.  The New Arrangements in 
Indigenous Affairs are a large part of that promise because they embrace the 
policy of negotiating agreements and engaging the sovereignty of Indigenous 
Australian groups.  Positive outcomes are emerging under the New 
Arrangements, albeit slowly and on a small scale.  For the Mulan 
community, trachoma rates are now at zero percent and the community has 
already signed another SRA to get training and supplies to refurbish their 
run-down basketball court.248  With honesty, transparency, and dedication, 
the Government can correct its own missteps, alleviate the discomfort 
associated with this change, and finally move forward in fulfilling its 
promise to eradicate Indigenous inequity. 
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